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Abstract The telecare medical information systems
(TMISs) enable patients to conveniently enjoy telecare ser-
vices at home. The protection of patient’s privacy is a key
issue due to the openness of communication environment.
Authentication as a typical approach is adopted to guarantee
confidential and authorized interaction between the patient
and remote server. In order to achieve the goals, numerous
remote authentication schemes based on cryptography have
been presented. Recently, Arshad et al.(J Med Syst 38(12):
2014) presented a secure and efficient three-factor authen-
ticated key exchange scheme to remedy the weaknesses of
Tan et al.’s scheme (J Med Syst 38(3): 2014). In this paper,
we found that once a successful off-line password attack
that results in an adversary could impersonate any user of
the system in Arshad et al.’s scheme. In order to thwart
these security attacks, an enhanced biometric and smart
card based remote authentication scheme for TMISs is pro-
posed. In addition, the BAN logic is applied to demonstrate
the completeness of the enhanced scheme. Security and
performance analyses show that our enhanced scheme sat-
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isfies more security properties and less computational cost
compared with previously proposed schemes.
Keywords Authentication · Elliptic curve cryptosystem ·
Smart card · Biometric · Telecare medicine information
systems
Introduction
With comprehensive employment of the mobile networks,
TMISs enable telecare which builds a convenient bridge
between patients at home and the remote server a reality.
In such system, patients without leaving home can access
the same medical services as at hospital. TMISs provide
greatly facilitate for some patients who are inconvenient to
go to hospital, which saves a lot of the patients’ expenses
and time. The problem is that the patients’ sensitive infor-
mation may be eavesdropped by an illegal entity due to
the unreliable communication channel. Therefore, a fea-
sible authentication mechanism [1–5] is essential needed
to ensure security and integrity of transmitting data for
TMISs.
In 2009, Wu et al. [6] presented an authenticated key
exchange scheme for TMISs and declared their scheme
was more efficient compared with the previous schemes
for TMISs by adding a precomputation step. However, He
et al.[7] identified that the scheme was susceptible to inter-
nal and masquerade attacks. Then, He et al. introduced a
more secure authentication scheme to conquer these flaws.
Later, Wei et al.[8] pointed out that both Wu et al. and He
et al.’s schemes were prone to suffer from off-line password
guessing attack. An improved scheme with more security
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was designed by Wei et al. But Zhu et al. [9] discovered
that Wei et al.’s scheme was still insecure against off-line
password guessing attack. In order to eliminate such pit-
fall, Zhu et al. further proposed an enhancement based on
Wei et al.’s scheme using RSA [10]. In 2013, Wu et al.
[11] pointed out that Jiang et al.’s scheme [12] had some
security drawbacks and proposed a new authentication
scheme for TMIS. Unfortunately, Wen et al. [13] observed
that Wu et al.’s scheme did not provide patient anonymity
and failed to resist server spoofing and off-line password
guessing attacks. In order to erase these drawbacks, Wen
et al. proposed their modified scheme based on Wu et
al.’s scheme. Lately, other researchers also proposed their
authentication and key agreement schemes for TMISs [14–
16]. All in all, above schemes aim to achieve two factor
authentication.
Lately, research in two factor based authenticated key
exchange schemes employing biometric have attracted a lot
of well-deserved attention. In comparison to password, bio-
metrics keys have many advantages [17], such as cannot
be lost or forgotten, copied or shared, hard to be forged
or distributed and cannot be guessed easily. Many biomet-
ric based authentication schemes combine password and
smart card were appeared [18–23], and were becoming
one of the most widely adopted authentication mechanisms.
Awasthi et al. [24] presented a biometric authentication
nonce based scheme for TMISs. However, Mishra et al.[25]
observed that Awasthi et al.’s scheme was vulnerable to
off-line password guessing attack and did not provide effi-
cient password change option. Soon after that Tan et al.[26]
found that Awasthi et al.’s scheme did not resist reflection
attack and did not achieve three factor security and user
anonymity. To remedy the weaknesses of Awasthi et al.’s
scheme, Tan et al. presented a three factor authentication
scheme and claimed that their scheme was secure against
various attacks. Recently, Arshad et al.[27] pointed out that
Tan et al.’s scheme did not withstand denial-of service and
replay attacks. They then presented an improved elliptic
curve cryptosystem (ECC)-based [28, 29] scheme to prevent
the flaws.
In this paper, we briefly review Arshad et al.’s scheme.
We demonstrate Arshad et al.’s scheme fails to protect
against off-line password guessing attack. Additionally, we
show that in case the adversary succeeded in getting iden-
tity and password of an arbitrary user, he can impersonate
any user of the system. Furthermore, we put forward a
biometric based authentication scheme for TMISs to cope
with the loopholes of Arshad et al.’s scheme. The pro-
posed scheme also employs lower computational operations
such as ECC and hash function to lower its computational
cost. Besides, we adopt BAN logic [30] to demonstrate
the completeness of the enhanced scheme. Moreover, we
present the security and performance analyses to show that
our enhanced scheme satisfies more security properties and
less computational cost compared with previously proposed
schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
“Review of Arshad et al.’s scheme” and Section “Weak-
nesses of Arshad et al.’s scheme”review and security anal-
ysis of Arshad et al.’s scheme, respectively. Section “Pro-
posed scheme” and Section “Analysis security” show our
proposed scheme and analyze its security. Section “Func-
tionality and performance comparisons” depicts the func-
tionality and performance comparison among the proposed
scheme and other related ones. Section “Conclusion” is a
brief conclusion.
Review of Arshad et al.’s scheme
This section briefly reviews Arshad et al.’s biometric based
password authentication scheme for TMISs. Their scheme
contains three phases: registration, authentication and pass-
word change. Notations that will be used throughout the
paper are listed in Table 1.
Registration
(1) U selects his identity IDi , password PWi , a random
number NC and imprints his biometric Bi . Then, he
computes MPWi = PWi ⊕ NC, MBi = Bi ⊕ NC
and submits {IDi, MPWi, MBi} to S.
(2) S verifies whether IDi is in his database or not. If IDi
is not found, S calculates AIDi = h2(x||IDi), Vi =
MPWi ⊕ MBi ⊕ IDi = PWi ⊕ Bi ⊕ IDi , and
Wi = h1(MBi)⊕h1(MPWi)⊕IDi ⊕AIDi . Further-
more, S chooses a random number NS and computes
Ri = x ⊕ NS , and MIDi = IDi ⊕ h1(NS). After
that, S keeps IDi in his database and the information
{Vi,Wi, Ri,MIDi, τ, d(·), E, n, P, Y, h1(·), h2(·)}
into a smart card SCi .
(3) U stores NC into SCi . Now, SCi contains
{NC, Vi,Wi, Ri,MIDi, τ, d(·), E, n, P, Y, h1(·), h2
(·)}
Table 1 Notations
U, S The patient and the telecare server
IDi, PWi, Bi Identity, password, biometric of the patient
H(·) Biohash function
h1(·), h2(·) Hash function h1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l , hash function
h2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p .
x Private key selected by S
⊕, || Exclusive-or operation and concatenation operation
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Authentication
(1) U inserts SCi into a smart card reader, inputs IDi ,
and PWi , and imprints biometric B∗i at the sen-
sor. Then, SCi computes Bi = Vi ⊕ PWi ⊕ IDi
and verifies whether the equation d(Bi, Basti ) <
τ holds or not. If holds, SCi computes AIDi =
h1(Bi ⊕ NC) ⊕ h1(PWi ⊕ NC) ⊕ IDi ⊕ Wi ,
selects a random number dC and continues to com-
pute RC = AIDidCP = h2(x||IDi)dCP , and
V1 = h1(IDi ||RC ||AIDi ||TC), and sends a message
REQUEST {RC, TC, V1, MIDi, Ri} to S, where TC
is the current time.
(2) When receiving the message, S checks whether the
transmission delay is within the allowed time inter-
val ΔT . If TS − TC < ΔT , S computes NS = x ⊕
Ri , derives IDi by computing MIDi ⊕ h1(NS), and
checks whether IDi exists in database or not. If exists,
S checks whether h1(IDi ||RC ||h2(x||IDi)||TC) ?=
V1. If holds, S selects a random number dS and com-
putes QS = dSP and K1 = h2(x||IDi)−1dSRC =
dSdCP . Furthermore, S chooses a random num-
ber NNewS and computes R
∗
i = h1(K1) ⊕ x ⊕
NNewS , MID
∗
i = h1(K1) ⊕ IDi ⊕ h(NNewS ), and
V2 = h1(MID∗i ||QS ||K1||R∗i ||IDi). Finally, S sends
the message CHALLENGE {QS, V2, MID∗i , R∗i } to
U .
(3) After receiving the message, U computes
K2 = dCQS = dCdSP and checks whether
h1(MID
∗
i ||QS ||K2||R∗i ||IDi) ?= V2. If the equation is
true, U computes MIDNewi = MID∗i ⊕h1(K2)IDi ⊕
h1(N
New
S ), and R
New
i = R∗i ⊕ h1(K2)x ⊕ NNewS .
Then, U updates the values of MIDi and Ri with the
values of MIDNewi and R
New
i , respectively. Finally,
U computes V3 = h1(K2||QS ||IDi), and the shared
session key SK = h1(IDi ||QS ||K2), and sends a
message RESPONSE {V3} to S.
(4) After receiving the message, S checks whether
h1(K1||QS ||IDi) ?= V3. If equal, S accepts the shared
session key SK as SK = h1(IDi ||QS ||K1).
Password change
U inserts SCi into the card reader, inputs identity IDi , pass-
word PWi and imprints his biometric B∗i at the sensor. SCi
computes Bi = Vi ⊕ PWi ⊕ IDi and checks whether the
equation d(Bi, B∗i ) < τ holds or not. If holds, U keys a
new password PWNewi and imprints a new personal bio-






V Newi = PWNewi ⊕BNewi ⊕PWi⊕Bi⊕Vi = PWNewi ⊕
BNewi ⊕ IDi
WNewi = h1(BNewi ⊕NC)⊕h1(PWNewi ⊕NC)⊕IDi ⊕
AIDi and updates SCi’s memory Vi, Wi by V Newi , W
New
i .
Weaknesses of Arshad et al.’s scheme
This section shows that Arshad et al.’s scheme [27] has two
security drawbacks, which are discussed in the following
subsections. The following attacks are based on the assump-
tions that a malicious attacker A has completely monitor
over the communication channel connecting U and S in
login and authentication phase. So A can eavesdrop, modify,
insert, or delete any message transmitted via public channel
[31].
Not withstanding the off-line password guessing attack
The password and identity are low entropy [32, 33].
Therefore, A can guess a password PW ′i and an iden-
tity IDi with the help of achieving values [34, 35]
{Vi, Wi, Ri, MIDi, τ, d(·), E, n, P, Y, h1(·), h2(·)}
from the medical device and {RC, TC, V1, MIDi, Ri}
from the login request message as follows:
(1) A guesses PW ′i and ID′i and computes AID′i =
h1(Vi⊕ID′i⊕PW ′i⊕NC)⊕h2(PW ′i⊕NC)⊕ID′i⊕Wi ,
V ′1 = h1(ID′i ||RC ||AID′i ||TC). Then, A checks V ′1 ?=
V1.
(2) If the verification succeeds, considers ID′i and PW ′i
as the user’s identity and password. Otherwise, he
repeats (1).
If A successfully guesses the identity and the password of
the patient, it will result into another attack. The detail of
the attack is discussed as the next subsection.
Not withstanding the user impersonation attack
As described in the previous subsec-
tion, A can read [34, 35] the information
{Vi,Wi, Ri,MIDi, τ, d(·), E, n, P, Y, h1(·), h2(·)} stored
in the smart card. After successfully guessing the password
PWi and IDi , A can launch a user impersonation attack
with the eavesdropped message {RC, TC, V1, MIDi, Ri}
in the following:
(1) A generates a random number d ′C and computes
R′C = AIDid ′CP, V ′1 = h1(IDi ||R′C ||ADIi ||T ′C).
After that, he sends the REQUEST message
{R′C, T ′C, V ′1, MIDi, Ri} to S, where T ′C is the
current timestamp.
(2) After checking the freshness of T ′C , S derives NS
and IDi and verifies h1(IDi ||R′C ||h2(x||IDi)||T ′C) ?=
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V1. Obviously, the equation will be held due to the
true identity. S then continues to perform the origi-
nal scheme without any detected. Finally, S delivers
the CHALLENGE message {QS, V2, MID∗i , R∗i }
to A.
(3) A imitates what the patient were doing and computes
V3 and sends it to S, where V3 = h1(d ′CQS ||QS ||IDi).
When receiving the value V3, A will surely pass
through S. As a result, S negotiates the session key
SK = h1(IDi ||QS ||d ′CQS) with A who masquerades
as the legal patient.
Proposed scheme
This section presents a slight modification scheme to rem-
edy the weaknesses of Arshad et al.’s scheme. The pro-
posed scheme aims to propose an efficient improvement
on Arshad et al.’s scheme to overcome the weaknesses of
their scheme, while also retaining the original merits of
their scheme. In the proposed scheme, in order to resist the
off-line password guessing attack, we employ biometrics
to conceal password. And we adopt Biohashing to protect
biometrics of patients, which can resolve high false rejec-
tion and hence decrease denial of service access probability
[36, 37]. And biohashing is very efficient and lightweight
as compared to modular exponentiation and elliptic curve
point multiplication [38, 39]. The proposed scheme also
contains three phases: registration, login and authentication
and password updating (Fig. 1).
Registration
(1) The patient U inputs his biometric Bi , identity IDi and
password PWi . Then, U calculates MPi = PWi ⊕
H(Bi) and submits {IDi, MPi} to the server S.
(2) When receiving the message, S computes AIDi =
IDi ⊕ h2(x), Vi = h1(IDi ||MPi) and issues
a smart card SCi which contains the information
{AIDi, Vi, h1(·), h2(·), H(·)} to U .
Login and Authentication
(1) U inserts SCi into a card reader and keys his identity
IDi , password PWi and biometric Bi . SCi computes
h1(IDi ||PWi ⊕ H(Bi)) and verifies whether it is
equal to the value V1. If true, U passes through the
verification. Then, SCi selects a random number du
and computes K = h1(IDi ||IDi ⊕ AIDi),M1 =
K ⊕ duP,M2 = h1(IDi ||T1||duP ), and transmits
{M1,M2, AIDi, T1} to S.
(2) When receiving the login request, S first examines
whether |T1−Tc| < ΔT , where Tc is the current times-
tamp of the S. If holds, S uses his private key x to
derive IDi by computing M1 ⊕ h2(x), he then com-
putes duP = K ⊕ M1 and checks h(IDi ||T1||duP ) ?=
M2. If correct, S then generates a random number ds
and computes M3 = K ⊕ dsP, SK = dsduP,M4 =
h1(K||T2||SK||duP ), where T2 is the current times-
tamp. At last, S sends the message {M3,M4, T2} to
U .
Fig. 1 Registration and
authentication phase of the
enhanced scheme
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Table 2 BAN logic notations
A| ≡ X A believes a statement X
U
K↔ S Share a key K between user and sever
#X X is fresh
A  X A sees X
A| ∼ X A said X
{X, Y }K X and Y are encrypted with the key K .
(X, Y )K X and Y are hashed with the key K .
< X >K X is xored with the key K
(3) Upon receiving the message, U first checks the fresh-
ness of T2. Then, U retrieves dsP by computing
M3 ⊕ K and computes SK = dudsP, M ′4 =
h1(K||duP ||SK||T2) to verify whether M ′4 is equal
to the received M4. If holds, U computes M5 =
h1(K||dsP ||SK||T3) and then sends the message
{M5, T3} to S, where T3 is the current timestamp.
(4) After receiving {M5, T3}, S verifies whether |T3 −
Tc| < ΔT and M ′5 = h1(K||dsP ||SK||T3) ?= M5.
If both conditions hold, S authenticates U and accepts
SK as the session key for further operations.
Password change
If U doubts his password may be leaked, he can alter the
old password to a new one as follows. U inserts his SCi
into the device and submits his IDi , PWi and Bi . Then
SCi verifies whether h1(IDi ||PW ⊕H(Bi)) ?= Vi . If valid,
U inputs a new password PWnew, SCi calculates V newi =
h1(IDi ||PWnew ⊕ H(Bi)) then replaces Vi with V newi .
Analysis security
This section conducts a cryptanalysis of the enhanced
scheme both through Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN)
logic [30] and security features.
Proofing scheme with BAN logic
BAN logic [30] is a set of rules for defining and analyz-
ing information exchange schemes (Table 2). It helps its
users determine whether exchanged information is trust-
worthy, secured against eavesdropping, or both. It has been
highly successful in analyzing the security of authentica-
tion schemes. We first introduce some notations and logical
postulates of BAN logic used in our scheme.
(1) BAN logical postulates
a. Message-meaning rule: A|≡A
K↔B,A{X}K
A|≡|B∼X : if A
believes that K is shared by A and B, and sees X
encrypted with K , then A believes that B once said
X.
b. Nonce-verification rule: A|≡#X,A|≡B|∼X
A|≡B|≡X : if A
believes that X could have been uttered only
recently and that B once said X, then A believes
that B believes X.
c. The belief rule: A|≡X, A|≡Y
A|≡(X, Y ) : if A believes X and
Y , then A believes (X, Y ).
d. Fresh conjuncatenation rule: A|≡#X
A|≡#(X, Y ) : if A
believes freshness of X, B believes freshness of
(X, Y ).
e. Jurisdiction rule: A|≡B⇒X, A|≡B|≡X
A|≡X : if A believes
that B has jurisdiction over X and A trusts B on
the truth of X, then A believes X.
(2) Idealized scheme
U : < duP >
U
K←→S,< IDi >h2(x)
, (IDi, duP, T1), (U
SK←→ S, dsP, T3)
U
K←→S
S : < dsP >
U
K←→S, (U
SK←→ S, duP, T2)
U
K←→S
(3) Establishment of security goals
g1. S| ≡ U | ≡ U SK←→ S
g2. S| ≡ U SK←→ S
g3. U | ≡ S| ≡ U SK←→ S
g4. U | ≡ U SK←→ S
(4) Initiative premises
p1. U | ≡ #du
p2. S| ≡ #ds
p3. U | ≡ U K←→ S
p4. S| ≡ U K←→ S
p5. U | ≡ S ⇒ (U SK←→ S)
p6. S| ≡ U ⇒ (U SK←→ S)
(5) Scheme analysis
a1. Since p3 and U  (U SK←→ S, duP, T2)
U
K←→S ,
by the message-meaning rule, we get: U | ≡ S| ∼
(U
SK←→ S, duP, T2).
a2. Since p1 and a1, by the fresh conjuncatenation
and nonce-verification rules, we get: U | ≡ S| ≡
(U
SK←→ S, duP, T2).
g1. Since a2, by the belief rule, we get: U | ≡ S| ≡
U
SK←→ S.
g2. Since p5 and g1, by the jurisdiction rule, we get:
U | ≡ U SK←→ S.
a3. Since p4 and S  (U SK←→ S, dsP, T3)
U
K←→S ,
by the message-meaning rule, we get: S| ≡ U | ∼
(U
SK←→ S, dsP, T3).
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Table 3 Functionality comparison
Ours Arshad et al. [27] Tan et al. [26] Awasthi et al. [24] Wen et al. [13]
User anonymity Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The session key perfect forward secrecy Yes Yes - - Yes
Insider attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Impersonation attack Yes No Yes - -
Off-line password guessing attack Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Replay attack Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Modification attack Yes Yes Yes - -
a4. Since p2 and a3, by the fresh conjuncatenation
and nonce-verification rules, we get: S| ≡ U | ≡
(U
SK←→ S, dsP, T3).
g3. Since a4, by the belief rule, we get: S| ≡ U | ≡
(U
SK←→ S, dsP, T3).
g4. Since g3 and p6, by the jurisdiction rule, we get:
S| ≡ U SK←→ S.
Security analysis
This section shows the enhanced scheme has the ability to
endure different security attacks including the aforemen-
tioned attacks found in Arshad et al.’s scheme. The follow-
ing attacks are based on the assumptions that a malicious
attacker A has completely control the whole communication
channel connecting the patients and the telecare server in
login and authentication phase. So A can eavesdrop, modify,
insert, or delete any message transmitted via public channel
[31].
User anonymity
The patient’s identity IDi is concealed all the transmit-
ted messages and is protected by one-way hash func-
tions. If A attempts to derive IDi , he needs to know
the server’s private key x or the random numbers gen-
erated by U and S. Obviously, this values are secret
only known by U and S. Therefore, it is impossible to
track the patient who is involved in the authentication
session.
Insider attack
The patient registers to S by presenting PWi ⊕ H(Bi)
instead of plaintext PWi . Since Bi is unknown to the insider,
it will be difficult to retrieve PWi from PWi ⊕ H(Bi).
Therefore, a privileged insider S cannot attain the plain-text
password and hence he cannot pretend the patient to login
other telecare servers.
Off-line password guessing attack
Assume that A reads [34, 35] the information {Vi, AIDi}
stored in the smart card and tries to guess a password in an
off-line manner. To verify the correctness of password, A
needs to know patients’s IDi and biometric Bi at the same
time. To obtain IDi from AIDi , the telecare server’s private
key x is needed. Since A cannot know the biometric Bi and
x which is only with U and S, respectively, it is hard for A
to plot an off-line password guessing attack with smart card.
Impersonation attack
A does not impersonate a legal patient to server since he
cannot generate a valid login request {M1, M2, AIDi, T1}
without the knowledge of U ’s identity IDi and S’s private
key x. Both the two values IDi and x are unknown to A.
Similarly, A cannot impersonate as a server to cheat a legal
patient without knowledge of x. Only when A knows x he
will derive IDi from intercepted messages. But x is the
secret key of S, A cannot know. In a word, it is infeasible
for A to launch an impersonation attack.
Table 4 Performance comparison
Ours Arshad et al. [27] Tan et al. [26] Awasthi et al. [24] Wen et al. [13]
Registration 3Th 4Th 3Th 3Th 3Th
Login and authentication 4Tpm + 11Th 4Tpm + 15Th + 2Tm+ 6Tpm + 11Th 6Tpm + 9Th 1Tm + 4Ts + 8Te+
+1Tinv +1TF + 5Th
Password change 3Th 4Th 4Th 4Th 4Th
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The session key perfect forward secrecy
Even if the patient’s password PWi and server’s pri-
vate key x are compromised by A, the session key SK
for the previous sessions is still kept unrevealed. On
the one hand, the password PWi and server’s private
key x are not utilized for computing the session key.
On the other hand, it is impractical to compute SK =
dudsP without knowledge of du and ds . As a result, the
enhanced scheme achieves the session key perfect forward
secrecy.
Mutual authentication
U validates S’s message {AIDi, M1, M2, T1} by check-
ing whether the timestamp T1 and the condition M ′2 = M2
are valid. S validates U ’s message {M3, M4, T2} by check-
ing whether the timestamp T2 and the condition M ′2 = M2
hold.
Replay attack
Assume that A intends to resend the old message
{M1, M2, AIDi, T1} to login to S. The attack will be
immediately detected by S by verifying the freshness of T1.
Besides, S will also discover the forged message by verify-
ing the correctness of the value M2 = h1(IDi ||duP ||T1).
Therefore, it is impossible for A to plot the replay attack.
Modification attack
Both the patient’s identity IDi and the server’s private
key x are hidden in all the transmitted messages. Any
forged messages will be examined by U or S. It seems
impossible for A to intercept the transmitted messages
and hence modify them without knowledge of the two
values.
Functionality and performance comparisons
In this section, we compare the functionality and perfor-
mance analyses of the enhanced scheme with the previous
related schemes [13, 24, 26, 27]. Table 3 shows that the
enhanced scheme is more secure than other related schemes.
In the performance comparison, define pm, m, inv, s, F ,
e and h be the time for performing an elliptic curve point
multiplication, a modular multiplication, a modular inver-
sion, a symmetric encryption/decryption, a pseudo-random
function, a modular exponentiation and a one-way hash
function. From Table 4 we can see that the overall computa-
tional cost for the enhanced scheme is less computationally
costly than those of schemes [13, 24, 26, 27].
Conclusion
We have discussed the security of Arshad et al.’s scheme
and discovered that their scheme was vulnerable to off-line
password guessing attack which leads to an adversary could
impersonate as a legal user to access any services provided
by telecare server. We employ hash function, ECC nonce
and biometric based authenticated key exchange scheme
as the primitives to improve the security and efficiency
of Arshad et al.’s scheme. The enhanced scheme not only
satisfies many security features but also has the lowest
computational cost among other related schemes.
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